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For Your Thought 
After two years in the position of Editor I am 
delighted to report that the Colonial Lawyer will be 
receiving a transfusion of new blood when Charles 
Poston assumes the helm. I had desired to leave 
Colonial Lawyer on a high key and this issue has 
satisfied all the requirements. 
During the past two years I have become deeply 
concerned over environmental problems and by 
using Virginia as a reference point, I have tried to 
comprehend all of the issues involved and be able to 
offer a positive solution. After a period of time, I 
faced the realization that the common denominator 
which existed for most of the non-technological 
problems was intelligent land use planning. Whether 
the problem was overcrowding, autos, oil refineries, 
second home development or airport location, land 
use planning offered the optium solution. 
The issue of the Colonial Lawyer contains four ar-
ticles that address themselves to various aspects of 
this area. Professor Donaldson questions the con-
tinued usefulness of Euclid zoning in our fast  
changing society. Jim Murray's article was part of 
the winning essay of the Environmental Law Essay 
Contest here at Marshall-Wythe. He gives a solid 
case for state level land use planning and suggest 
other possible approaches to the problem. 
With many expanding zoning concepts, the two 
areas which deserve special attention are aesthetic 
zoning and the use or abuse of subdivision or-
dinances. Everett Priestley, photographer turned 
writer, shows the agonizing development of 
aesthetics as a basis for action and explains some of 
the problems that will have to be faced before there 
is any furthur development in this area. Leslie Hoff-
man, who will be Departments Editor for the 
Colonial Lawyer next year, has written a 
provocative article on the abuse of subdivision or-
dinances. What demands may a municipality make 
on the subdivider before they become an un-
constitutional taking of the developer's land? 
Each one of these articles contains the ingredients 
for a revolution in the American concepts of an in-
dividual's property rights and of the scope of a 
state's police power. This is an area that cries out 
for change. I submit that the legal profession should 
take lead in the discussion and this issue of the 
Colonial Lawyer con be the first step in that direc-
tion. § 
News 
N.Y. Lawyer 
The Marshall-Wythe School of Law 
honored Whitney North Seymour of New 
York, a post president of the American 
Bar Association, at its annual low review 
banquet Saturday at the Williamsburg 
Lodge. 
Mr. Seymour received the Marshall-
Wythe Medallion which was com-
missioned in 1966 for presentation by the 
School of Law to leaders of the legal 
profession in the United States and 
abroad. 
Mr. Seymour, senior partner of the 
New York law firm of Simpson, Thatcher 
and Bartlett, was president of the 
American Bar Foundation from 1960-64 ; 
 president of the American College of 
Trial Lawyers, 1963-64 ; president of the 
Institute of Judicial Administration, 1968-
69; and president and chairman of the 
American Arbitration Association, 1953-
55 and again from 1955-57. He was 
president of the American Bar 
Association from 1960-61. 
NEW FACULTY 
Marshall-Wythe will attain another 
first with the arrival of one of three new 
professors expected next September. Dr. 
Erma M. Lang, A.B. Ohio State ; M.A., 
Ph.D. Harvard; J.D. Georgetown, will be 
the first woman law professor to teach at 
William and Mary. Dr. Lang will come to 
us directly from the University of 
Mississippi School of Law. She is a mem-
ber of the District of Columbia, Nevada, 
and Massachussetts Bars and has prac-
ticed law in both Boston and Lake Tahoe, 
Nevado. She hos also served os a foreign 
service officer, working as an economic 
analyst in Paris, Vienna and Washington. 
The other new faculty members will be 
Messieurs Douglas Rendleman and Elmer 
J. Schaefer. Mr. Rendleman received his 
B.A., M.A. and J.D. at the University of 
Iowa and his LL.M. at the University of 
Michigan. He was a law clerk for an 
Iowa Supreme Court Justice for a year 
and has been on the faculty of the 
University of Alabama Law School since 
1970. 
Mr. Schaefer received his A.B. at Nor-
thwestern University and his M.A. and 
J.D. at Harvard. He has been with the 
Chicago law firm of Jenner and Block 
since 1969. 
MOOT COURT TOURNAMENT 
Six 	 schools 	 participated 	 in 	 the 
prestigious Annual William and Mary In-
vitational Moot Court Competition on 
Saturday, April 14. Hosted by the Mar-
shall-Wythe team were teams from the 
University of Maryland, University of 
Virginia, University of North Carolina, 
Duke University and defending National 
Moot Court Team Champion Georgetown 
University. Oral arguments contested the 
constitutionality of the "bombshell 
charge" to juries during criminal trials, 
i.e. the charge to a deadlocked jury that 
they must soon come to a decision. 
Georgetown won first place for their 
argumentative excellence, while Duke 
placed second. Heading the list of seven 
prominent judges for the competition was 
former Supreme Court Justice Tom C. 
Clark, 
STATUS REPORT 
Three hundred twenty graduates had 
pledged $22,350 to the Marshall-Wythe 
School of Law Fund as of May 1 toward 
the $25,000 matching challenge offered 
by the College's Board of Visitors. 
According to the terms of the Board's 
challenge, a sum of $25,000 will be 
(Continued on page 20) 
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A REASSESSMENT OF THE 
LEGAL BASES OF ZONING 
— John E. Donaldson 
The legal and conceptual premises underlying the 
land use planning and control enabling legislation 
contained in most of the state statutory codes in this 
country impose serious constraints on the for-
mulation and implementation of effective land use 
plans and policies. The majority of such legislation 
is based upon the Standard Zoning Enabling Act, 
published by the United States Department of Com-
merce in 1926, and the Standard City Planning 
Enabling Act published by the same agency in 1928. 
These models, and the state enactments they 
spawned, reflect the trends, attitudes, values and 
planning notions of an era that has passed, and 
their utility in the field of land use planning is 
diminished by the present state of the art. 
A well formulated and implemented land use plan 
requires a knowledge of what the community is, an 
understanding of what it wishes to-become, an ap-
preciation of the forces which may be present in the 
immediate and distant future, and a familiarity with 
the range of options and techniques for en-
couragement and control of development. It requires 
the skills of the engineer, attorney, statistician, 
demographer, economist and political scientist, as 
well as the synthesis and coordination of the 
professional planner. It also requires a legal 
framework and climate appreciative of its role and 
conducive to the realization of its objectives. It is the 
John E. Donaldson earned his J.D. degree 
at William and Mary and an LL.M. at 
Georgetown and is now a Professor of Law at 
Marshall-Wythe. He is also presently serving 
as a member of the. Board of Supervisors of 
James City County, Virginia. 
adequacy of this framework and climate which I will 
explore. 
Just as water can rise no higher than its source, 
the limits of the effectiveness of a regulatory system 
are defined by the range of choices and methods 
permitted by its legal foundations. When our system 
of employer-employee relations was premised upon 
stringent adherence of the principle of "freedom of 
contract" and abhorrence of "conspiracies in 
restraint of trade", its effectiveness was defined 
within a context of prevalence of "yellow dog" con-
tracts and suppression of strikes. Because the system 
produced or afforded too great an advantage to the 
employer and placed the employee in too weak a 
bargaining position, the fundamental legal premises 
upon which the system was based had to be 
changed. It wasn't that the system was inherently 
wrong. It was merely unresponsive to the problems 
generated by the industrial revolution. 
If the legal and conceptual premises underlying 
land use planning and control enabling legislation 
unduly limit or fail to afford the range of techniques 
and controls required for the formulation and im-
plementation of effective land use policies, they 
should be carefully examined and appropriately 
modified. I believe the time for examination and 
alteration is at hand. 
The first such premise to be examined is the 
assumption that Euclidian zoning is the model to be 
formed and implemented in the particular com-
munity. The term "Euclidian zoning" is derived from 
the case, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 U. S. 365 (1926), and its notion is expressed in 
Section 2 of the Standard Zoning Enableing Act, 
which states: 
Sec. 2. Districts— For any or all of said purposes the 
local legislative body may divide the municipality into 
districts of such number, shape and area as may be 
deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of this 
act; and within such districts it may regulate and 
restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, 
alteration, repair, or use of buildings, structures, or 
land. All such regulations shall be uniform for each 
class or kind of building throughout each district, but 
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the regulations in one district may differ from those in 
other districts. 
On the assu mption that qualitatively different land 
uses are incompatible, Euclidian zoning defines a 
well planned community in terms of a map whereon 
is drawn geometric patterns or districts to which 
qualitatively similar land use authorizations are 
assigned with the effect of separating "higher uses" 
from "lower uses". Thus, in a typical case, single 
family dwelling districts utilizing large lots are 
isolated from the intrusion of dwellings on smaller 
lots which are separately districted. Both are protec-
ted from the intrusion of higher density residential 
land uses, and these, as the ever expanding protec-
ted class, are protected from the respective in-
trusions of commercial, light industrial, and heavy 
industrial uses. Further within each of the districts 
employed, regulations are uniform as to like 
buildings permitted therein. 
Euclidian zoning, in short, emphasizes the mutual 
repugnance of qualitatively different land uses and 
invites classification and districting along economic, 
aesthetic and functional lines with little regard to the 
interdependence of the activities permitted within the 
dynamic urban system. The Euclidian system, em-
phasizing the isolation of commercial and industrial 
activities and encouraging the segregation of 
"higher" residential uses from "lower" or more in-
tense residential uses, is a major contributor to the 
problem of urban sprawl and to the boring sym-
metry of housing developments laid out in ticky-tac 
patterns characterized by block after block of 
houses on 12,000 square ft. lots set back 35 ft. from 
the road, having side yards of 20 ft. and each 
costing $23,000. That the separation of "higher" 
residential uses from "lower" residential uses con-
tributes to racial segregation of housing within a 
given community is self-evident. 
The orientation of enabling legislation to the 
model of Euclidian zoning has caused the develop-
ment of a number of doctrines inimical to the for-
mulation and implementation of effective land use 
policies, chief among which are the following: 
1. Uniformity of regulations pertaining to lot size, 
set-back, side yards, etc. as they relate to similar 
structures is essential. Development is to occur in ac-
cordance with a preconceived, static objective and a 
readily measurable spatial standard .of what is 
tolerable for particular kinds of structures. Variances 
from the standard are not to be permitted merely 
because the variance is compatible; a variance is to 
be allowed only if there is undue hardship in com-
plia nce. 
2. Non-conforming uses by definition are bad, 
should not be enlarged, and should either be en-
couraged to decay or to be removed. That a par-
ticular non-conforming use may be compatible, or 
may afford some desirable service or amenity is af-
forded little weight. 
3. The introduction into a district of a dissimilar 
use either by special use permit or amendment to the 
zoning map contravenes the "ideal" of "symmetry 
of the same" and constitutes illegal "spot zoning", 
which in a number of states is presumed when sym-
metry is compromised. 
Although Euclidian zoning is the model envisioned 
in enabling legislation, it is not the ideal of in- 
creasing numbers of professional planners and 
students of urban order. More and more modern 
land-use-planning thought asserts that the key to 
harmonious, functional, and responsive urban and 
suburban environments is planning that emphasizes 
the unity of the community, the interrelationship of 
qualitatively different land uses, and the need for 
imaginative and creative design and arrangement of 
(Continued on page 17) 
".. . and the need for 
imaginative and creative design 
and arrangement of struc-
tures. " 
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The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. 
Picture a pasture open to all It is to be expected that 
each herdsman try to keep as many cattle as possible on 
the commons. Such an arrangement may work 
reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal 
wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both 
men and beast well below the carrying capacity of the 
land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that 
is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability 
becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the 
commons remorselessly generates tragedy. 
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to 
maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less 
consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding 
one snore animal to my herd-"... The rational herd-
sman concludes that the only sensible course for him to 
pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And 
another; and another.... But this is the conclusion 
reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a 
commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked 
into a system that compels him to increase his herd 
without limit - in a world that is limited. Ruin is the 
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing 
his own best interest in a society that believes in the 
freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings 
ruin to all  
realizing that it represents a "natural resource", 
worthy of, and demanding, protection. This 
represents more than a mere exercise in semantics. 
Our characterization of the land upon which we live 
carries with it important legal consequences. It is 
this changing trend and its legal ramifications which 
are the subjects of this writing. 
If indeed land is a resource then it represents 
something in which the entire public has an interest. 
Government regulations of land use then becomes 
constitutionally permissible, because the protection 
of exhaustible natural resources is a valid exercise 
of the police power of the state.' More than fifteen 
years ago a federal judge noted "[W]e cannot close 
our eyes to the manifold illustrations of experience, 
where man's over-exploitation has sharply 
diminished or even extinguished the supply of 
natural resources, wild game, and fish. 2 
It has been said that "the need for effective en-
vironmental land-use regulation is at least as great 
as the need for ordinary zoning regulations."' This 
attitude is so prevalent among students and 
practitioners in the planning field that it might be 
called an empirical "truth" rather than a postulate. 
The logic and arguments for the environmental 
necessity of land-use planning and the legal 
LAND DEVELOPMENT- 
A Right Or A Privilege? 
— James Murray 
Surprisingly, this allegorical archetype is not the 
futuristic rumination of Buckminister Fuller or Con-
stantine Doxiadis but rather it is one segment of a 
series of lectures on "The Checks of Population" 
delivered at Oxford University in 1833 by one W. F. 
Lloyd. Yet, despite the deligent and prophetic work 
by the precursors of our modern urban planners, it 
has only been in very recent history that the general 
public has become aware of the importance of 
managing land use. 
The trend of contemporary thinking in the study of 
land use is fairly simple to describe. We are ceasing 
to view land as a "commodity" and are now  
ramifications involved will be partially cataloged 
here. 
Classifying land as a "resource" and thus 
bringing it within the penumbra of the state's police 
power is only the first step in attacking a number of 
legal problems inherent in any state control of land 
use. A number of these problems have been solved, 
in part, by the new Virginia Constitution. 
Article XI of the revised Constitution of Virginia 
requires that all state government action be taken 
with explicit consideration of the environmental con-
sequences. Any effect this article will have on land-
use management in the State must be limited to 
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those land-use activities with environmental con-
sequences. The planners' response to this maxim 
would be that every land use activity has important 
environmental consequences. However this principle 
has seen little legal recognition. In fact, only in the 
case of power plant sitings have courts been 
generally cognizant of the serious environmental im-
pact of a land-use decision. This does not preclude 
arguments that other land-use decisions have im-
portant environmental ramifications. It does, 
however, restrict the environmental lawyer to non-
legal, but extensive, technical evidence. 
The Division of State Planning and Community Af-
fairs, in its report on Critical Environmental Areas, 5 
 sees land-use planning as an environmental 
necessity. They note that by the year 2000 (when the 
state's population will have doubled) we will need a 
300 percent increase in recreational areas. "A 
single development decision of sufficient magnitude 
in even a rural area can do extensive harm to an en-
vironmentally critical area. If state park land is not 
acquired or planned for soon it will no longer be 
confined realistically to lands in government owner-
ship, but must take into account whatever lands are in-
cluded in particular ecosystems, regardless of who 
holds title to them. This broadening of the policy con-
text may be opposed by persons committed to the 
inviolate right of private land ownership, or who hold 
specific interests in land use that they believe might be 
threatened by public action.... But if the management of 
whole ecosystems becomes a matter of public policy, 
then the formulation of public policy must proceed 
upon the basis of the proposition that all land is in 
some degree public. The metes and bounds of 
ecosystems ore determined by physical, biological, 
and cultural forces. Men may impose their own 
arrangements on natural systems, but engineers, sur-
veyors, and lawyers neither amend or repeal the so-
called lows of nature.° 
The principal impediment to government control of 
land use and development is the most basic of 
American socioeconomic tenets—the free enterprise 
system. The English companies formed to colonize 
America were primarily real estate consortiums 
organized for speculative purposes, and they 
initiated a uniquely American tradition of treating 
land as a commodity. Prior to the Revolutionary 
Reston, Virginia — A Planned Unit Development 
available. The selected critical environmental areas 
[established by the study] are generally privately 
owned properties with inadequate protection against 
adverse development." 
The environmental importance of land use 
management is usually viewed as so pervasive in the 
fight to save our environment that extensive govern-
ment control over the field is seen as inevitable. One 
environmental policy commentator has written that: 
...[A]n ecosystems approach [to land-use planning] 
may ultimately become necessary to human well being 
and even to survival...The discourse can no longer be 
War the colonies were under a "socage" system of 
land tenure which recognized an underlying state in-
terest in all lands within the jusrisdiction. However, 
the United States Constitution eliminated this system 
in favor of a system of "alloidal" tenure in fee sim-
ple. This decision has been termed a "most fateful 
and potentially tragic development" for 20th Cen-
tury land management problems and has been said 
to have "conferred on the individual owner a vir-
tually unrestricted right of use and abuse, limited in 
practice only by the legal doctrine of nuisance, the 
tenuous application of the police power. and the 
power of taxation." This system is now firmly im-
beded in the psyche of every American. No rights 
are more sacred than "property rights." "Subor-
dination of concern over the environment to private 
property rights was accentuated by the ideas of such 
men as John Locke, who were deeply concerned 
with individual property rights, and reasoned that 
there would always be enough land and water for 
future generations."' 
It is important to understand both this historical 
background of the American approach to land as a 
"commodity" and the economic motivation of those 
who would perpetuate it. In many instances the 
courts will balance the equities involved when a lan-
downer argues that the use of his land is being un-
duly restricted. The environmental lawyer would be 
wise to compare the ecological consequences of 
particular uses and their broad effects for society 
with the economic motivation of the landowner° 
Local economics is the basis of all regular 
American zoning decisions. But, even economists 
recognize the futility of a purely profit-oriented ap-
proach to exploitation of resources, including land: 
"[T]he system is finite. It cannot last because, for 
one thing, it fails to calculate in its earnings for-
mulas the ultimate capital expenditure: the earth it-
self. We are rapidly running out of natural resour-
ces."'° 
Thus, any legal activity involving land-use plan-
ning must be undertaken with consideration of this 
basic conflict between American free enterprise 
economics and the newly-recognized environmental 
detriments to the public generally. Social scientists 
have little difficulty in determining where the 
balance should be struck: "If our cities are to 
remain liveable, they will need parks and open 
space and in most cases in much greater quantity  
than at present. Surely the public health rights of 
hundreds of thousands of city dwellers are at least 
equal to the speculative money-making rights of 
individual or, increasingly, corporate landowners." 
The traditional, preeminent American view of land 
as an economic commodity with salability at the 
root of all land-use regultion finds support in the 
Constitution: no citizen of the United States may be 
deprived of property by his government without just 
compensation. This right is guaranteed by the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as by most 
state constitutions. It is the primary point of conflict 
in the vast majority of land-use cases. Deprivation of 
use or use potential by the government reduces 
market value and, it is argued, amounts to "taking" 
of property. "To be effective, environmental law 
must come to grips with [this] basic tenet of the 
American way of life...An individual is free to 
utilize, change, or destroy his possessions insofar as 
his actions do not seriously affect some other 
person; natural resources are meant to be used, i.e. 
consumed; there is no land form or physiography 
which is prima facie non-developable." 12 
Zoning is recognized as an exercise of the police 
power of the state for the purpose of promoting "the 
health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the 
community" and encouraging "the most appropriate 
use of the land". Courts will not invalidate a zoning 
ordinance simply because it diminishes the value of 
a landowner's property. The problems arise when a 
zoning or other land-use ordinance seriously 
restricts the permissable uses an owner may make of 
his property; for any major restriction which sub-
stantially deprives the owner of "all beneficial use 
and enjoyment" is usually classified as a con-
stitutionally-prohibited "taking". However, this doc-
trine is limited by an exception which allows vir-
tually unlimited regulation of land use if there is a 
substantial "public safety" interest involved. For 
example, flood plain ordinances are often allowed 
to virtually sterilize a citizen's land, prohibiting any 
beneficial use on grounds that constructive use of the 
land would amount to maintenance of a public 
nuisance. 
Another restriction imposed on land-use 
regulation under the compensation argument is the 
"public benefit theory". The essence of this restric-
tion is that a zoning regulation which is enacted 
solely for the benefit of the public, but which 
severely restricts the uses to which a private land-
owner may put his land, should give rise to an obli-
gation on the part of the public to pay the landown-
er for the benefit it receives. This situation arises 
when the only uses permitted the landowner are of a 
"public character", in which case "the courts 
sometimes seem to suspect the government of using 
the police power to create parks and wildlife sanc- 
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tuaries without paying for them." 
Whenever a land-use regulation is held con-
fiscatory with respect to a particular parcel of land 
the state may then determine whether the protection 
of that property from a particular type of develop-
ment is important enough to warrant some limited or 
complete acquisition of the fee. One alternative use 
of the police power, using eminent domain to con-
trol land use, is of limited effectiveness because the 
cost of any extensive program is prohibitive. 
A less expensive and particularly useful alter-
native to acquisition of the fee is state purchase of 
an open-space easement in the property. Another, is 
state purchase of "development rights" from the lan-
downer. Several states provide for such practices 
with the usual procedure providing that the owner 
retain all ownership rights subject to a very restric-
ted right of development in return for a tax ad-
vantage, usually a tax freeze at current rates or 
value. Virginia's Constitution specifically allows for 
state acquisition of such interests and it provides for 
tax incentives through tax assessment of property ac-
cording to its actual use. The chief fault with the 
easement or development right approach is that in 
order to be effective such an interest may often have 
to so restrict the owner's development rights that the 
property's market value is drastically reduced for 
the near future. The result is that the fair market  
value of the easement may be very close to the cost 
of purchasing the fee. 
Non-legal commentators hove gone so far as to 
argue that development rights are privileges granted 
by government acquiesence and therefore are freely 
alienable by government action. They contend that 
land ownership should be treated like any other in- 
vestment. Thus it is subject to diminution in value by 
government action, such as down-zoning, just as in- 
vestment in the stack market is subject to the 
vicissitudes of a government controlled economy.1 3 
 A factor commonly overlooked by those with 
economic interests opposed to land-use control is 
that the net long-term effect on the land investor 
may be beneficial. As space becomes scarce through 
the continued geometric expansion of population, 
the value of open space and potential park and 
recreation lands will grow proportionately. Land 
which is zoned to insure its character as open space 
and which carries a low annual property tax rate, as 
envisioned by many proposals, will be exceptionally 
valuable. "This recognition of new purposes for 
regulating land should not and does not mean that 
the old concerns with land's value and salability 
should be ignored. On the contrary, the longer- 
range view expressed in the new land regulatory 
systems will enhance land values over the long run 
to a far greater degree than systems motivated 
(Continued on page 13) 
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THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
"LAND GRAB" 
— Leslie A. Hoffmann 
The theories behind requiring land/fee exactions 
for municipal facilities as a condition precedent to 
subdividing are based upon the assumption that the 
municipality is "allowing" the subdivider to sell his 
land as lots and he therefore must compensate for 
any additional burdens his activity places upon 
public facilities. The question here does not concern 
the desirability of these improvements, but rather 
concerns who shall pay for them. The legal issue to 
be explored is to what extent is it reasonable for a 
subdivider to be required under the guise of police 
power regulation to dedicate a portion of his 
property to public use and at what point does this 
amount to confiscation of property in contravention 
of 5th amendment rights? There are several 
subissues to be pondered: To what extent, if any, are 
the rationales behind land dedications valid? Must 
the burden of improvements cast upon the developer 
be specifically and uniquely attributable to his ac-
tivity or can he be required to confer substantial 
benefits upon the public without receiving just com-
pensation? Since in actuality the developer passes 
on as much of these additional costs as possible to 
his purchasers, does requiring these new residents to 
"pay their own way" into the community 
discriminate' against persons who can not pay the 
cost of admission? Does this have an exclusionary 
impact based upon income resulting in concomitant 
racial exclusion? Do not these exactions result in a 
disproportionate burden upon new subdivision 
residents in contravention of the equal protection 
clause which requires fair and equal treatment 
among all persons similarly situated? Are not these 
exactions a form of revenue raising and should not 
they be treated as a tax and not as a police power 
regulation? 
PURPOSES OF LAND EXACTIONS 
According to the Census bureau, the U.S. 
population increased by 50 million in the last 30 
years and is projected to increase another 50 
million in the next 30 years. In addition, since 1950 
the U.S. has experienced great urban expansion in 
the fringe areas around our cities and this 
population movement is expected to continue at an 
even faster rate in the future) These two factors have 
burdened many municipal budgets to the point of 
financial crises in the effort to meet increasing 
demands with inadequate economic resources. Local 
governments have been engaged in a continual 
struggle to provide expanding suburbs with 
adequate schools, roads, recreational and municipal 
facilities. Unfortunately, population growth and ex-
pansion has proceeded more rapidly than planning, 
and cities have been caught with inadequate funds. 
In addition, it seems inevitable that demand will 
always exceed supply, and spending will always 
keep pace with revenues so that there will never be 
sufficient tax money to meet all current and long 
term obligations. Since subdivisions represent a 
potential drain on many aspects of the municipal 
budget (additional recreational space, police and 
fire protection, and school facilities), many 
municipalities have sought to minimize the economic 
impact of the influx of new people into the com-
munity by requiring subdividers to bear the costs of 
parks, schools, and other municipal facilities. These 
costs are in addition to improvements within the sub-
division itself such as interior streets, sewers, etc. In 
Pa. Coal v. Mahon (260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) 
Justice Holmes warned; "We are in danger of 
forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the 
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving 
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the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional 
way of paying for change". Have we ignored or 
forgotten this admonition? 
THE RATIONALES BEHIND REGULATION 
Not infrequently, when a subdivider approaches 
the local planning commission to seek approval of 
his plat, he is asked to dedicate a portion of his 
ground for arterial streets, playgrounds, schools, 
and other public facilities. If he refuses, his plot will 
not be approved. In many cases this practice of 
requiring land dedication as a condition precedent 
to plat approval can look suspiciously like a veiled 
unconstitutional exercise of the power of eminent 
domain; yet, none of the cases to date squarely face 
the question of why an uncompensated taking for 
public use is unconstitutional in all areas except that 
of subdivision controls. 2 Rather, courts have relied 
upon a number of rationales. Two such overlapping 
theories are the "voluntary" and "privilege" 
theories. The reasoning is as follows: because there 
is no right to subdivide, and the state need not per-
mit it, exactions can be imposed. Thus, theoretically, 
the owner "voluntarily" dedicates land to the 
municipality for the "privilege" of having his plat 
recorded. Two problems exist in these theories. First, 
since plat approval is generally statutorily required 
before the sale of lots commences, can it 
realistically be said that land dedications are volun-
tary? Secondly, recordation is a method of en-
forcement to insure the orderly planned growth of 
undeveloped areas. As such, recordation is merely a 
statutory grant of authority by which the 
municipality supervises land transfers and is not a 
source of power or privilege in and of itself. 
The second rationalization generally used to 
justify the taking of property without the due-process 
requirement of just compensation is the state's police 
power. The thrust of this theory is that subdivision 
control is like any other land use "regulation" which 
can constitutionally impose limitations upon the use 
of property. A word of caution: even though it is 
easy to relate any type of subdivision control 
"regulation" to the public health, safety and 
welfare, this does not mean that constitutional 
guarantees of due process and just compensation for 
property taken for public use may be ignored. 
Traditionally, the police power authorizes the state 
to prohibit only "uses" of property that are harmful 
to the public; it does not authorize the confiscation 
of property simply because it is useful to the public. 
The distinction between "taking" & "regulation" is 
outlined by Nichols in his treatise on Eminent 
Domain: "The distinguishing characteristic between 
eminent domain and the police power is that the for-
mer involves the taking of property because of its  
need for the public use while the latter involves the 
regulation of such property to prevent the use 
thereof in a manner that is detrimental to the public 
interest."3 "It is universally conceded that when land 
or other property is actually taken from the owner 
and put to public use by the public authorities, the 
constitutional obligation to make just compensation 
arises, however much the use to which the property 
is put may enhance the public health, morals, and 
safety." 4 Since land dedication requires the 
developer to deed the land to the local government 
for public use and benefit, it is difficult to un-
derstand how this action can be justified under the 
state's police power when it constitutes a blatant 
taking of land in contravention of 5th Amendment 
guarantees. 
Today, zoning ordinances and official map 
requirements give the community effective control 
over the layout and design of proposed subdivisions 
which was the original purpose for required plat 
recordation and subdivision control regulations. 
However, municipalities under the guise of sub-
division control seek not only to control subdivision 
design but also to shift the burden of needed 
municipal improvements upon the individual sub-
divider through a system of positive exactions which 
go for beyond the negative prohibitions which are 
the normal exercises of the police power. On this 
basis some authorities argue that exactions are a 
form of taxation. 5 These authorities maintain that 
exactions, in no real sense, regulate subdivisions in 
the interest of public health, safety and welfare, but 
rather represent municipal efforts to shift the burden 
of providing necessary public improvements upon 
the new subdivision homeowners. Thus, they claim 
that this is a tax problem and should be treated as 
such. 
(Continued on page 15) 
Many land dedication ordinances are 
deliberately made unreasonably severe in or-
der to discourage residential development. 
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Beauty and the Police Power 
— Everett P. Priestley 
One facet of zoning law is particularly irritating 
to me because of its lack of vision. More and more 
citizens are beginning to insist upon improvement of 
the quality of their environment, including demands 
that their communities be made more pleasing to the 
eye. Many people are concerned about the growing 
number of unplanned "shopping center rows," and 
monotonously designed residential developments. 
Yet, despite this desire for attractive surroundings, 
until recently there has been no statutory or 
decisional law bases for considering aesthetics in 
the development of our communities. The standards 
remain inadequately defined. 
Assuming, therefore, that most citizens would 
welcome imaginative, attractive, and well-planned 
structures and other improvements, aesthetic sanc-
tions are needed to effect this goal. Aesthetic zoning 
is not the complete answer. In fact, since it has 
never really been tried on a large scale without 
reliance on other aspects of the police power, it may 
not be the answer at all. Aesthetic control, and 
especially site plan reviews by a board of architects 
and other qualified persons, is a fine alternative and 
one worth experimentation. It will not make all 
shopping centers works of art or all subdivisions ar-
chitectural marvels, but it might go a long way 
toward eliminating the real eyesores. 
THE EVOLUTION OF AESTHETIC CONTROLS 
Zoning has its roots in the common law action of 
nuisance. Our professor Anderson has given the 
short hand definition of nuisance as "a pig in a 
parlor instead of the barnyard." The development of 
this area of the law allowed the later conclusion that 
the rights of property owners were not absolute and 
could be limited if found to be in contravention of 
the public health, safety or welfare. Out of this con-
cept grew the proposal that the police power of the 
community could be utilized to affect orderly 
development. The proponents of this concept 
brought their efforts to a head in 1926 with the 
carefully chosen test case of Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365. The success of 
this effort is attested to by the naming of that system  
of comprehensive planning Euclidian zoning. The 
concept soon achieved widespread use. By the end 
of 1930 zoning ordiances were effective in 67% of 
the urban population. Today just about every city or 
county has some type of comprehensive zoning plan. 
Zoning has had reasonable success in ac-
complishing its original goals, despite some 
chequered areas such as zoning boards on the take 
and the over-generous allowance of variances and 
exceptions. The drastic effects which are possible 
where the zoning board is irresponsible are demon-
strated by Fairfax County where the board was 
found guilty of accepting bribes. 
The other branch of the development of aesthetic 
control originated in the billboard battle which star-
ted in the 1890's. The first judicial reaction to the ef-
forts to curb or control billboards was a firm rebuff. 
In City of Passaic v. Patterson the court reasoned 
that "aesthetic considerations are a matter of luxury 
and indulgence rather than of necessity and it is 
necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the 
police power." This type of decision was reversed as 
early as 1911 when a Missouri court held a 
billboard regulation valid. The grounds given were 
not aesthetics, which was the true reason, but rather 
a string of arguments grounded in the police power. 
The signs were found to "endanger the public 
health, promote immorality, constitute hiding places 
and retreats for criminals and all classes of 
miscreants ....they are constantly used as privies and 
for the lowest forms of prostitution." Gratuitously 
and with a certain caution, the court also mentioned 
that billboards are inartistic and unsightly. 
BEAUTIFUL AS WELL AS HEALTHY 
There have been many later decisions which have 
credited aesthetic values, but never as the sole basis 
for regulation. An economic basis invariably was 
found. Important examples of the beauty which 
could be preserved and developed even with this 
requirement are the carefully regulated areas in 
Williamsburg, Santa Fe, New Orleans and Nan-
tucket. But the next big impetus in the progress 
toward pure aesthetic regulation came in an eminent 
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aesthetic considerations alone may warrant an exer-
cise of the police power." With these and other 
cases the trend has come very close to an allowance 
of police power based on the sense of sight.. 
Virginia law is not in this vanguard. Kenyon Peck 
Inc. is Kennedy, 168 S.E.2d 117 (1969), 'reiterated 
that a municipality or county cannot limit or restrict 
the use which a person may make of his property 
under the guise of its police power where ... justified 
solely on aesthetic considerations. There was, 
however, an unreported case in Fairfax County 
where prohibition of high rise apartments was 
allowed because a scenic view would have been 
blaffectuatealready existing houses_ 
DEFINING AESTHETIC CONTROLS 
- THE ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON 
domain case, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 
(1954). This case involved the constitutionality of a 
District of Columbia renewal program. The 
statement may have been dictum, but it has been 
cited so widely that it has had considerably more 
weight than mere dictum. The Supreme Court, 
speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, stated that "It 
is within the power of the legislature to determine 
that the community should be beautiful as well as 
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as 
well as carefully patrolled." This language has been 
quoted, almost without exception, in all succeeding 
efforts to use state or municipal police power to ef-
fectuate control of the beauty of a community. 
Since Berman a few isolated cases have 
validated ordinances based almost exclusively on 
aesthetics, but there has been no stampede. In State 
ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. is Wieland, 69 
N.W.2d 217 (1955), the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
upheld an ordinance requiring approval by a 
Building Board before any structure could be built. 
The exterior architectural appeal could not be at 
great variance with other structures in the area. 
Once again aesthetic values were coupled with 
property values. The important and familiar case of 
People is Stover, 191 N. E. 2d 272 came in 1963. 
Here protesting taxpayers had hung rags, old 
uniforms and underwear in their front yard. The City 
of Rye, New York passed an ordinance prohibiting 
the erection of clotheslines which blocked driver 
vision—a conventional police power function. The 
court went beyond this standard on its own initiative 
and approved the statute on an aesthetic basis. 
However, it still threw in the protection of real estate 
values to support its holding. In 1965 Oregon City 
is Hartke, 400 P.2d 255 cited Stover in sustaining a 
total ban on wrecking yards from the city. In so 
holding they stated that "We join the view that 
In his hornbook on Urban Planning in § 48, 
Hagman states that aesthetic control is one which at-
tempts to preserve or improve the beauty of an area 
as perceived by the sense of sight. To this he im-
mediately adds the caveat that no one has to look, 
but odors and sounds are difficult not to notice. In 
that phrase is capsulized the history of aesthetic 
zoning. Because it has always been rationalized that 
one can avoid looking at ugliness, it has invariably 
been left out of the potent forces of police power. 
The other major stumbling block which has 
traditionally been laid in front of controls for beauty 
sake is that of vagueness. Public health, safety and 
morals submit to reasonable definition, it is said, but 
aesthetic considerations vary greatly with the wide 
variations of taste and culture. Since no precise def-
nition can be given, all such ordinances are doomed 
to be vague and incapable of enforcement without 
arbitrariness. However, when you examine the other 
branches of the police power, which have been 
legitimized, you find imprecision which is far 
greater than that in aesthetic controls. for example, 
what is obscene? What can a government ban as of-
fensive to public sensibilities? A movie like Deep 
Throat may be temporarily cut from the screens of 
New York and Williamsburg, but how long will the 
courts allow such a ban to continue? How long will 
Roth remain the obscenity standard? There are a 
great number of imprecise areas in the law. When 
the courts agree that conditions have changed, and 
that aesthetics should assume their rightful plate in 
the police power, we will probably be able to live 
with the imprecision involved. 
After the initially hostile reaction to aesthetic con-
trols, the court system softened It position to the 
point where beauty could be a consideration, as 
long •as controls were mainly based on other areas 
of the police power. Except in the few recent cases, 
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this remains the basic policy of the law today. The 
policy was summed up by Roscoe Pound: "Beauty 
may not be queen, but she is not an outcast beyond 
the pale of protection or respect. She may at least 
shelter herself under the wing of safety, morality or 
decency." 
Are we not in a position finally to give beauty a 
rightful place? Aren't we wealthy enough that every 
dollar doesn't have to pay its own way. Can't the 
desire to maximize profits be tempered by the need 
to have structures approved before they are built. 
This is not to say that the tastes of a few should be 
imposed on the rest. But with model legislation, and 
legislative guidelines, a board of knowledgeable 
people reviewing site plans could constitute just 
enough coercion to make builders build with the 
public in mind. Edmund Burke once wrote: "To make 
us love our country, our country ought to be made 
lovely." Perhaps he didn't refer to aesthetic zoning, 
but he does give the gist of the need for such stan-
dards. Our surroundings have a profound effect on 
our daily productivity and the fulfillment of our 
potentials. Perhaps court resistance to aesthetic con-
trol is a factor in urban blight, high crime rates and 
the ugliness in much of the present development. To 
have a respect and love for his community, a person 
must be able to appreciate the beauty of his surroun-
dings as well as its profit potential. If there is no 
pride in the community, then the scruples about har-
ming it are lessened. In the classic article Zoning 
For Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 Law 
and Contemporary Problems 218 (1955), J.J. 
Dukeminier, Jr. put it this way, "Our communities 
need to achieve an environment that is emotionally 
satisfactory, that effects a reduction in purposeless  
nervous and physical tensions of the inhabitants. 
When the inner life of an individual is out of 
balance, anxiety occurs, expressing itself in a num-
ber of socially destructive ways." 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, TECHNIQUES, 
AND THE OUTLOOK 
Zoning is under attack. The newest front of the 
civil rights movement is fighting the effects of ex-
clusionary. Euclidian zoning, with its separate areas 
for more desirable residences, has had the effect of 
stratifying communities along economic lines. Urban 
sprawl can be traced at least in part to the present 
concepts of zoning. In California zoning is being 
used to exclude commune from suburbia. Areas are 
reserved for single family dwellings and the term 
family is being redefined to exclude the communal 
family. In another article in this issue, the use and 
constitutionality of cluster zoning is examined. This 
concept rejects the traditional method of blocking 
off entire developments in lots without provision for 
common areas. With cluster zoning houses and 
apartments are being placed closer together, with 
large areas of undeveloped land reserved as com-
mons for recreation and natural maintenance. The 
idea of allowing families to isolate themselves on 
the biggest lot they can afford is losing favor. In-
stead of sideyards that are good only for mowing, 
high priced land is now being preserved for the type 
of mental expansion that is impossible in the typical 
subdivision. 
Historical areas are being preserved under 
various systems. Williamsburg represents the most 
(Continued on page 19) 
12 
LAND DEVELOPMENT 	 (from page 7) 
primarily by a desire to increase immediate 
salability." 
From a legal standpoint, the situation is in a state 
of flux. Obviously, there will be some recognition of 
environmental consequences in future planning 
decisions. This is precisely what is required by the 
new Virginia Constitution. However it remains to be 
seen how far toward the courts will allow the pendu-
lum to swing toward total state control over all land 
use. 
Land-use planning has been called "the base of 
the pyramid for environmental control." Indeed, a 
new awareness shared by an increasing number of 
environmentalists makes increased government con-
trol over land-use inevitable. There is little doubt that 
the consensus of expert opinion favors state-wide 
planning controls and views such measures as the 
trend. 5 
In this context Virginia's Land Use Task Force has 
said: "The existing policies of land use in the Com-
monwealth are grossly inadequate to fulfill the 
State's constitutional mandate for assuring a quality 
environment. The Task Force has concluded that the 
Commonwealth needs an explicit state-wide land 
use policy with appropriate instruments to execute 
that policy." 16 
The Council of State Governments lists numerous 
problems which are factors in generating a need for 
an increased state role in land resource 
management. Such problems include rapid, un-
coordinated, piecemeal and excessive land develop-
ment; lack of adequate provision for future land-use 
needs of agriculture, forestry, and industry; 
inadequate protection of water supplies, wildlife, 
and unique or historical areas; the need for "new 
town" development; and inadequate local planning 
and zoning." 
The problem with this approach, besides the op-
position of land speculators with vested economic in-
terests, is that the states have traditionally viewed 
"land-use control as an urban problem". However, 
it is becoming apparent that "local zoning is 
inadequate to cope with problems that are state-
wide or region-wide in scope, [and this] has fueled 
the quiet revolution in land-use control." 18 
Russell Train, Chairman of the Council on En-
vironmental Quality writes: "[A]s our society has 
become more complex it has become clear that 
some land use determinations of one locality often 
have important consequences for citizens in other 
areas. It is in these issues of greater than local 
significance in which state and regional involvement 
seems appropriate, even necessary, if the broader 
community affected by such decisions is to have 
some influence over them."" 
The popular press reflects the some attitude; a 
recent article in the Wall Street Journal noted that 
states are beginning to take back some of the land 
use regulating authority from local bodies: 
Fragmented control simply can't cope with today's 
problems of protecting the environment, minimizing 
the chaos of urban sprawl and providing adequate 
space for housing and industry that increasingly sweep 
across city and county boundaries. It's clear that states 
are beginning to rethink their policies for the first time 
in nearly half a century. And, as a result, a growing 
number of planners, land use experts, and government 
officials agree: The era for total local dominption in 
the field is over....The problems of providing enough 
land for housing, recreation, conservation, and in-
dustrial and commercial development can no longer be 
solved by individual municipalities....[Property taxes 
ore] a major stumbling block to state wide land con-
trols....lf they compel communities to shore tax bur-
dens, the court decisions would go a long way toward 
relieving the pressure on municipalities to compete for 
new development, thus making statewide land - use laws 
easier. State officials are far more willing to consider 
environmental values and the impact that a project 
may have...than are municipal officials." 
A state-wide plan of land-use control would 
alleviate many complaints about local myopia 
caused by greed and economic discrimination. Any 
such plan would necessarily be arbitrary in nature 
but it would be far less vulnerable to criticism of 
being discriminatory against particular landowners. 
In the numerous rural counties of Virginia where 
land values are more consistent county-wide, and 
long range development controls would have less 
immediate drastic economic impact, this is par-
ticularly true. A more difficult situation is presented 
in the highly urbanized areas where undeveloped 
real estate is a rare "commodity". Here, treating 
such land as a "resource" worthy of protection by 
the state would subject the state to claims of "taking 
without just compensation" and eventual state pur-
chase would probably be necessary. 
The Virginia Constitution creates no obligation for 
the General Assembly to act, in contrast to the 
Revision Commission's proposal and the en-
vironmental provisions of a number of state con-
stitutions. 2 ' Thus any such legislation that the Assem-
bly might pass would probably be the result of 
pressure from environmentalists, The State Division 
of Planning and Community Affairs, and the federal 
government. In the latter case the impetus would be 
considerable if proposed land-use legislation is 
passed by Congress. Proposed legislation would 
create economic sanctions for those states which do 
not have a conforming state-wide land-use plan and 
regulatory authority. The passage of federal 
legislation which will require states to implement 
state-wide land-use planning controls seems virtually 
inevitable, particularly considering the support the 
Administration-Jackson Bill received in the 92nd. 
Congress. 22 
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The existence of Virginia's Constitution, Article XI, 
and the establishment of the environmental necessity 
of planning does not in itself assure Virginians of 
ecologically sound land-use planning any more than 
would the creation of a state-wide planning 
authority. The problem of implementation remains. 
Justice Musmanno of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has written: -"[O]ne's bread is more im-
portant than landscape or than clear skies. Without 
smoke, Pittsburgh would have remained a very 
pretty village." 23 Likewise, many people of similar 
persuasion, who honestly feel that they harbor a 
justifiable concern for the economy of their own 
locale and who candidly harbor a deep concern for 
their own economic welfare, have managed to 
neutralize some of the best efforts of en-
vironmentally conscious lawyers to see that the spirit 
of legislation such as the Virginia Wetlands Act and 
the proposed state-wide planning ordinances is 
respected, and that the policy enunciated in article 
XI is observed in the doily operations of govern-
ment. 
"[Land use] law is often politically enunciated 
and politically enforced. The substance of the statute 
is enacted in response to political pressures, en-
forcement is placed in the hands of executive branch 
officials whose main concern is the political impact 
of their actions, and it is all too infrequent that 
political desires coincide with technologically and 
socially effective solutions." 24 One glaring example 
of how strong, well motivated, environmentally con-
scious legislation can be rendered toothless and en-
vironmentally destructive can be found in the Tahoe 
Regional Planning Compact, a multi-state planning 
agreement that was hailed as the savior of the 
ecologically critical, and only marginally stable, 
Lake Tahoe Region. The compact is a shambles now 
that its implementation has begun and this is largely 
due to the fact that the members of the Regional 
Planning Agency, who were supposed to take a 
longer and broader view than the existing local 
planning entitles, are in large majority the same tun-
nel-visioned local business representatives that had 
endangered the ecological balance of the region in 
the first instance. The citizens of the area, led by the 
League to Save Lake Tahoe, are now desperately 
seeking a way to halt the planning authority, which 
they hailed only 14 months before, because it ap-
pears destined to perpetuate and guarantee the 
ruination of a beautiful wilderness area. 25 
Over one hundred years ago Federick Low 
Olmstead, who was America's first landscape architect 
and city planner, as well as the designer of New 
York's Central Park, foresaw the urban blight in-
digenous to unrestricted metropolitan sprawl and 
fought to have the city not only reflect the needs of 
commerce but of "humanity, religion, art, science  
and scholarship. Long before the end of the 
Nineteenth Century he foresaw the choked, crowded 
Manhattan we now see, the need for green, grassy 
suburbs, the interdependence of adjoining urban 
regions, and the threat to the air itself. When asked 
to build Prospect Park in Brooklyn--his finest park--
he tried to lift the eyes of the politicians to a 
regional system of parks and roads running from the 
Atlantic Ocean to the Hudson Valley. But they kept 
their eyes to the ground; 'Practicality' triumphed, 
and we are left today with the debris of that prac-
ticality. 26 
It is Olmstead's sort of approach to land use that 
has now been universally accepted by scientists, 
scholars, and even lawyers as not only en-
vironmentally attractive but as critical to the future 
of the world. It remains, however, for the legislature 
and the courts to adapt the legal system to reflect 
this same recognition. § 
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LAND GRAB 	 (from page 9) 
PRACTICAL EFFECT OF LAND DEDICATIONS 
Generally speaking, the public shifts the burden 
of the needed improvements upon the purchaser. But 
to consider the effect upon the homeowner there 
must be a distinction drawn between the different 
types of improvements charged to the purchaser. The 
on-site improvements such as streets, curbs, 
sidewalks, gutters, etc. have caused few problems. 
These improvements benefit solely the property 
within the subdivision and the need is caused direc-
tly by the subdivider's activity. The cost when passed 
on to the home buyer is not unreasonable because 
expenses for these improvements could be directly 
charged to the property owner by a special 
assessment. But, serious questions are presented 
where municipalities predicate plat approval upon 
the meeting of conditions which require the 
developer to construct facilities which exceed the 
needs of his development (which constitute a wind-
fall to other property owners) or require him to 
dedicate land for general municipal facilities such 
as schools. 
Municipalities justify such requirements by 
rationalizing that the population increase which is 
responsible for these needed facilities is attributable 
to the builder's activity and, therefore, he should be 
made to bear the burden of his own profit-making 
venture. There are two fallacies in this 
rationalization. The first is that the builder is respon-
sible for the community's growth. Population ex-
pansion is due to (1) the geometric growth of 
population and (2) the location and desirability of 
the community itself. The builder merely seeks to 
meet an already existing demand. Thus, realizing 
that the demand is directly related to the normal 
. overzealous officials try to exact as 
much as possible without regard to the 
developers' rights or the effect upon new 
residents." 
growth of the community itself, it is difficult to justify 
exactions which benefit the public at large when the 
subdivision residents constitute only a portion of the 
population influx into the community and only a por-
tion of the public benefiting from such improvement. 
When the subdivider is forced to subsidize the 
public, one of two results occur, both of which result 
in increased consumer costs. First, if the developer is 
forced to absorb the additional burden, he will have 
little incentive to engage in this high risk activity 
again. As the supply of lots decreases, newcomers 
will be forced to pay higher prices for available lots 
and homes or seek older housing elsewhere. 
Second, if the developer shifts the costs to the pur-
chaser, the new owner will be forced to pay a 
higher price for his land. In either case, the effect of 
land exactions is to stem the tide of population 
migration by indirectly slowing growth by closing 
off the supply of housing or by increasing costs. 
Either way, the municipalities can effectively place 
the cost of single family dwelling beyond the reach 
of many Americans. Thus, in reality, exactions 
require new persons to pay the price of admission 
into an existing community by way of public im-
provement fees. This practice has an exclusionary ef-
fect upon those who con not afford the price. In Ap-
peal of Kitmar Builders, 268 A. 2d 765 {1970), the 
court held that municipalities may not refuse to con-
front population growth by adopting regulations 
which effectively restrict population. The court 
-admonished the town to provide the services which 
traditionally had been the municipality's respon-
sibility to furnish. Where many land dedication or-
dinances are deliberately made unreasonably severe 
in order to discourage residential development 5 , 
this decision is equally applicable. 
Query: Are new homeowners really paying their 
own way or more? While new residents pay for their 
share of the municipal facilities in their neigh-
borhoods, they are not relieved from property taxes 
used to meet the obligation of previous municipal 
bonds which pay for the facilities in the existing 
parts of town. Secondly, other new residents who do 
not live in subdivisions, such as buyers of existing 
village lots, townhouses, and condominiums and 
apartment dwellers all utilize and burden public 
facilities, but pay no like fee. Therefore subdivision 
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homeowners carry a disproportionate burden of 
municipal expenses. To quote New York Supreme 
Court Justice Van Voorhis in his dissent to Jenad, 
Inc. v. City of Scarsdale 218 N.E. 2d 673, 677, 
(1966), "There must be apportionment of tax bur-
dens either among all property owners of the state, 
or the local division, or the property owners 
specifically benefited by the improvements...lf one is 
required to pay more than his share and he receives 
no corresponding benefit from the excess, ... that 
may properly be styled extortion or confiscation. A 
tax or assessment upon property arbitrarily imposed 
without reference to some systems of just ap-
portionment can not be upheld." Thus, to burden 
only subdivision homeowners with indirect exactions 
for provide community facilities is discriminatory 
and in contravention of equal protection which 
requires fair and equal treatment among those 
similarly situated, Ronda Realty Co. v. Lawton, 
111 N.E. 2d 310 (1953). 
PRACTICAL NEED TO COMPLY 
Unfortunately, discrimination against outsiders is 
far from academic because many fast growing 
suburbs seek to prevent migration by making it 
economically onerous to enter a community. The 
problem remains as to what is being done, and the 
answer to that question is basically: nothing! The 
reason for this inaction is that exactions are seldom 
challenged because of the practical need to comply 
with the municipality's requirements. The average 
builder is under considerable pressure to move as 
quickly as possible to get his job done. Con-
sequently, if the city conditions the approval of his 
plat with an exaction costing him $12,000 plus lost 
profits, he has 3 alternatives: (1) to hold the land un-
til the city buys or condemns it, (2) "voluntarily" 
dedicate the land and lose $12,000 in plus profits, 
or (3)litigate the issue of the city's power to impose 
the condition or the reasonableness of the condition. 
Typically, the subdivider chooses the second alter-
native because he depends upon rapid turnover of 
his capital to survive. No builder can (profitably) af-
ford the two or three years necessary to litigate the 
constitutionality of the condition(s). Subdividers who 
are faced with the fiscal problems of paying both 
taxes and interest on borrowed capital on unim-
proved prime development land plus meeting 
overhead expenses and contract obligations with 
general contractors, subcontractors and 
materialmen, can not afford to wait for justice to 
take its course. In addition subdividers fear incurring 
the of the city which could result in the use of 
harassment techniques such as rezoning or dif-
ficulties in securing building or occupancy permits. 
If the builder wants to subdivide in the city again he 
must submit to the exactions! 
The high cost of litigation is not only due to the 
stiff price of waiting but also includes the high cost 
of assembling the comprehensive proof necessary to 
prove the unreasonableness of the exactions. The 
strong presumption of constitutionality afforded the 
state, as well as the traditional judicial deference 
given to government, makes the burden of proof dif-
ficult to meet. 
Because builders are reluctant to take 
municipalities to court to test the reasonableness of 
conditions imposed, it appears that the latter are in 
on extremely powerful position. Knowing that 
developers rely upon speed to keep operating and 
that any attempt on their part to resist fees or 
dedication results in lengthly and costly delays, 
overzealous officials try to exact as much as 
possible without regard to the developers' rights or 
the effect upon new residents. Surprisingly, some of-
ficials negotiate dedications even if they are not 
given this power by statute or ordinance.' In ad-
dition, many existing ordinances which purportedly 
give certain powers in this area are not even con-
stitutional. 9 Concessions can vary from contributing 
$100,000 for a new school to requiring deeds that 
restrict the size of the homes to a size larger than 
required by ordinance.° Thus the door is wide open 
to arbitrary discrimination and abuse. This danger is 
even more likely where officials are members of the 
'local population who would rather make new 
residents bear more than their fair share than to 
have to bear the cost themselves. Therefore, 
statutory standards and enabling legislation which 
would require municipalities to comply with 
statutory mandates would be one step towards 
restraining the unlimited coercive power presently at 
the finger tips of local authorities. Policing of these 
communities should be done by the state as well as 
making challenge by the private sector more 
feasible. Statutes should allow the developer to 
reserve the land required for dedication, but allow 
him to proceed with his development until the 
reasonableness of such exaction is judicially deter-
mined. Thirdly, the states should secure planning on 
regional levels to insure the co-operation and co-
ordination of communities and to insure orderly 
area growth rather than permitting innumerable 
groups, each seeking to serve only its own interest, 
to adversely affect area development by disregar-
ding the general welfare of the region. Lastly, on the 
local level, cities should develop overall plaons for 
the location of municipal facilities. They should 
budget funds and secure passage of bonds for the 
purchase of undeveloped land before it becomes 
prime development land purchased by the 
developer, for orderly planning will secure orderly 
growth without having to resort to unconstitutional 
means of financing it. § 
16 
1 Hauser, Implications of Changing Metropolitan 
Areas, Planning (1958). 
2 Subdivision Exactions: Where Is The Limit?, 42 
Notre Dame Lawyer 400, 403 (1967). 
3 	 Nichols, Eminent Domain, 87 (1964). 
4 	 Id. at 90-91. 
5 	 Heyman and Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Im- 
posing Increased Community Costs on New Subur-
ban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 
Yale L.J. 1119 (1964). 
6 Fagin, Regulating the Timing of Urban Develop-
ment 20 Law and Contemporary Problems 298, (1955). 
7 Hanna, Subdivisions: Conditions Imposed by Local 
Government 6 Santa Clara Lawyer 172, 191 (1966). 
8 Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling 
Community Growth On the Urban Fringe, 1961 
Wis. L Rev. 370, 386. 
9 	 Id. at 389. 
10 	 Id. at 392. 
REASSESSMENT 	 (from page 3) 
structures. The well planned community, under this 
approach, is not necessarily one in which like uses 
are first aggregated and then separated from dif-
ferent uses, but is instead one in which the uses per-
mitted are so arranged and ordered that the 
dynamics of the urban system can function at the 
highest level consistent with the public welfare. The 
key to effectiveness under this approach is not sym-
metry and division, but performance and unity. 
Utilizing this key, it may well be possible for the 
planner, who sees the urban system as a dynamic in-
terrelated process fed by change rather than as a 
static order, to envision a workable, non-Euclidian 
plan for a particular community. He may develop a 
practical design for a partially developed area 
predicated upon uniqueness, not uniformity, in which 
"non-conforming uses" may be enlarged and blen-
ded into the whole, and in which additional uses of 
a qualitatively different nature which afford needed 
amenities aesthetically compatible. But the legal 
climate in which most planners must function, heated 
by a Euclidian sun and made humid by uniformity, is 
too stifling for this kind of productive endeavor. 
A number of studies have concluded that Euclidian 
zoning, with its static concepts, just does not work in 
areas where development pressures are strong. In-
creasingly, development occurs not under zoning, 
but by amendments to zoning ordinances and maps. 
Non-Euclidian planners-zoners, recognizing the 
need for flexible response capability in im-
plementation oordinances in recent years, have in-
troduced the concepts of "planned unit develop-
ment", "residential planned communities", the 
listing of multitudes of uses permitted only by ad-
ministrative discretion governed by a standard such 
as "hold zoning" "contract zoning", the "floating 
zone", and "performance zoning". While these 
more flexible implementation techniques afford ad-
vantages lacking in a purely Euclidian approach, 
they are, in the minds of many, incompatible with  
the assumption that zoning should be in accordance 
with a comprehensive plan with mop appended. 
Although judicial acceptance of these techniques is 
increasing, it remains nonetheless true that their 
legal underpinnings are insecure. 
In summary on the point, I do not suggest that the 
Euclidian be outlawed, only that the non-Euclidian 
be more effectively accommodated by the legal 
system. This can be accomplished by eliminating 
from zoning enabling legislation requirements that 
regulations be uniform and expressly authorizing the 
use of performance standards and flexible 
techniques to guide, encourage and control land 
development and use. 
The second premise underlying current land use 
planning enabling legislation is that the formulation 
and implementation of land use policies belongs en-
tirely at the local level of government. With few ex-
ceptions, states have delegated the police power 
over land use to the localities without retaining or 
reserving power or procedural tools to protect the 
state interest from adverse local planning and im-
plementation activity. Just as local planning and im-
plementation proceeds from an awareness that the 
common weal can be served by subjecting individual 
tracts to land use controls, it would seem that state 
planning would assume that the interests of the state 
as a whole may require the developmental patterns 
of localities to be subjected to state influence and in-
volvement. In England and several European coun-
tries, local planning is required to serve not only 
local needs, but broader needs as well. This is not 
so in the United States, with the possible emerging 
exceptions of Vermont, California and Florida. 
Does a state need a ready capability to direct, in-
fluence and control local planning activity and the 
development undertaken pursuant thereto? Several 
examples, which I hope will constitute a sufficient 
answer, follow: 
1. When all of the suitable farm and grazing land 
in a state is already put to agricultural uses, and the 
state's population is rapidly expanding, can it wisely 
permit to localities the determination of whether 
such land is to remain as part of the agricultural 
economy or be developed into subdivisions? 
2. When a substantial segment of a state's 
population can afford housing no better than mobile 
homes, can a state wisely leave to localities the 
determination of whether mobile home parks are a 
permitted use in a community? 
3. When there is a substantial unemployment in a 
region of the state that could be significantly 
ameliorated by the location of a prospective major 
industry in a particular locality, can the state wisely 
leave to the locality the determination of whether or 
not the industry is welcome? 
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4. In a region of the state where water resources 
for human consumption and industrial use are 
scarce, may the state wisely permit individual 
localities, through their land use plans, to determine 
the allocation which actual development under such 
plans will assure? 
The list could be expanded. The point is that local 
land use plans reflect local values and perceptions 
of self-interest and may not reflect the broader 
needs of the state and region. 
In a number of states a beginning awareness of 
the state interest in local land use practices is 
evident, as witnessed by the various wetlands 
statutes, coastal plains land use control codes, and, 
in Virginia, the undertaking of studies to identify 
"area of critical environmental concern". What is 
needed, however, is a candid acknowledgement to 
the effect that on a broader scale, land use practices 
in the localities are of sufficient potential 
significance to the general welfare of the state as to 
justify direct state involvement at the local level of 
planning and implementation. 
Such involvement could take a number of forms, 
one of which might be expressly affording the state 
standing to enjoin developmental activity believed to 
be injurious to state or regional interests. The 
proposed oil refinery and industrial complex 
proposed for Nansemond, Virginia, of concern to 
the people of Norfolk, Newport News, Virginia 
Beach and Portsmouth, is an example of a situation 
to which a state response would probably be ap-
propriate. Other approaches could involve requiring 
local land use plans and implementation ordinances 
to be submitted to an appropriate state agency for 
review and comment before adoption and amend-
ment, requiring that they be in conformity with a 
state-wide land use plan, which would in effect be 
implemented through control and coordination of 
local plans. 
In the context of this problem, one must keep in 
mind that any question involving relationships bet-
ween the state and its localities, or their respective 
areas of jurisdiction, is essentially a political 
question which must find its resolution in the 
political arena. When the issue is state control over 
land use, the political question is highly con-
troversial, if not explosive. Nonetheless, it needs to 
be resolved in the interest of the whole, not the 
parts. 
The third principle which I would question is the 
principle that land is the target towards which land 
use planning enabling legislation is aimed, and that 
as a consequence, traditional concepts of property 
rights, real property rights, limit the regulation and 
control of land uses. The emphasis on land has 
clouded the vision of the public, the courts, and the 
practioners in the planning field with unnecessary  
distortion and impairment. I submit that the true sub-
ject of regulation in land use planning and im-
plementation is not land, but activity, and that a 
zone which permits a specific land use is, in reality, 
conferring s license to engage in that activity. If the 
orientation of the legal basis of land use planning 
related to the issue of the reasonableness of the 
licensing requirements and procedures applicable to 
the acitvities beinng regulated, rather than to the 
reasonableness of the "land controls", the air would 
be clearer and planning could occur in a better 
legal climate, with the requirement of 
"reasonableness" still being maintained. In sub-
stance, I believe land use planning to be primarily a 
process which attempts to allocate and coordinate, 
within a spatial context, the activities that are to be 
carried on in the community, and to promote 
physical harmony by the imposition of design 
criteria related to height, bulk, and open space. 
Land is entirely secondary. It is activity with which 
the planner and the community are primarily con-
cerned. 
Two statements illustrate the point I wish to make. 
Both statements are credible and have a wide 
following. The first is: A man should not be 
deprived of his property without compensation. The 
second is A contemplated activity genuinely and 
materially affecting the public interest is a proper 
subject of regulation. Suppose that the legal issue is 
whether the developer of a proposed shopping cen-
ter adjacent to a major artery can be legally 
required to construct and maintain a parallel artery 
to accommodate the traffic problem which his 
development would create. The Courts are divided in 
their response to the issue, some regarding the 
question as essentially a property matter, to be 
resolved in the context of traditional notions of 
property rights, while others recognize the question 
as essentially one in which the issue is the 
reasonableness of a condition attached to the licen-
sing of an activity. I subscribe to the latter view, and 
believe that government may properly regard 
development as an activity, which, in a spatial as 
well as a broader context, can be subjected to 
reasonable licensing requirements. 
In summary and conclusion, I believe that the fun-
damental legal underpinnings of state land use plan-
ning enabling legislation require examination and 
modification if land use planning and im-
plementation is to be effective. The shortcomings of 
the Euclidian concept, the negligence of state non-
involvement, and the limitations of, the misplaced 
emphasis on land, as opposed to activity, as the 
critical subject of concern must be remedied. At-
tention to these problems has not been lacking. 
Responsible critiques and suggestions for im-
provement of the state of the art and practice of 
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land use planning and control techniques abound in 
current literature in the field. Perhaps the most 
noteworthy attack on the inadequacy of state 
enabling legislation is the undertaking of the 
American Law Institute to develop a model act, 
which in tentative draft is known as "A Model Land 
Development Code". The project, begun in 1963, 
may produce o final draft in 1974. Although the 
language of the tentative draft is just that, tentative, 
I would note that the draft abandons Euclidian ter-
minology, recognizes a broader state role in the for-
mulation and implementation of local land use 
plans, and regards developmental activity, rather 
than land as the subject of planning and im-
plementation. Among other things, the draft seeks to 
improve administration, authorizes localities to offer 
development incentives, permits condemnation for 
purposes of encouraging development, expressly 
authorizes the imposition of land dedication 
requirements and of fees to defray public expenses 
that may need to be incurred in response to develop-
ment, and provides a system for making public land 
use decisions affecting individual parcels public 
records that may readily be examined in a "title" 
search. The Code, when adopted and published in 
final form by the American Law Institute, is certain 
to have a major impact on the reformation of 
enabling legislation across the county—certainly a 
delightful prospect. § 
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extensive and probably the most successful effort. 
The National Trust and other societies are working 
to catalogue important structures so they won't be 
demolished. New York City has an innovative 
program which lists landmarks and prohibits their 
destruction or changes without prior approval. This 
has been suggested to be an unjustified interference 
with property rights. An alternative could be the pur-
chase of negative easements against the destruction 
of historic areas. Robert L Montague III in an ar-
ticle at 51 Va. L Rev. 1214 (1965) suggests a system 
of tax incentives to be used in Virginia for the 
preservation of its many antiquities. Even with these 
efforts to catalogue and preserve, the loss of im-
portant landmarks continues. Under a program 
inaugurated in the 1930's the Historic American 
Buildings Survey listed more than 10,000 buildings 
worthy of preservation. It was estimated in 1963 
that 50% of these buildings, significant in America's 
history and culture hod already been destroyed. 
Another unfortunate development is demonstrated 
by Seagram & Sons v. Tax Commission, 200 
N.E.2d 447 (1964). The Seagram building in New 
York City had been built with unusual core and the 
result was a beautiful structure that promoted the 
economic interests of the owner and enhanced the 
beauty of the city. The Tax Commission chose to 
adopt a different appraisal system which increased 
the owners tax bill. This was an obviously self-
defeating and short-sighted action, but it was af-
firmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The most attractive method for enhancing the ap-
pearance of our communities is the adoption of ar-
chitectural boards of review. These have been rejec-
ted in several cases, but the time is ripe for their ac-
ceptance. Whatever the method adopted, aesthetic 
control is a vital field and one worth the efforts of 
the legal profession. The wealth and know-how are 
available. The question remains whether the courts 
and the legislatures will provide the legal framework 
for protecting the beauty of our communities. The 
alternative is for our generation to be remembered 
only as the innovators of "shopping center row." 
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made available from endowment as an 
impetus to the drive on the assumption 
that an equal amount will be raised from 
fifty percent of the membership of the 
Law School Association. 
Wayne O'Bryan of Richmond, 
President of the Law School Association, 
is chairman of this the School's first an-
nual alumni fund drive. Over ninety 
volunteers are contributing time and 
energy to the effort. Professional 
guidance and staffing is being provided 
by William and Mary's Office of College 
Development. 
Contributions should be made payable 
to "William and Mary - Law School" and 
mailed to Marshall-Wythe School of Law 
Fund, Box EH, Williamsburg, Virginia 
23185. 
Third-year law students of Marshall-
Wythe have initiated a fund-raising effort 
among members of that class. 
Each graduating student is being 
asked by class volunteers to pledge his 
financial support of the School for three 
years following completion of his degree. 
According to Tom Wright, who is coor-
dinating the effort among students, his 
twelve volunteer workers pledged over 
$1,000 during their one-hour 
organizational meeting. 
The effort among students was for-
mally kicked-off at a cocktail party 
hosted by the Law School Association for 
third-year students, spouses, and fian-
cees. Wright reports that as of May 1 
$6,530 had been pledged, topping the 
class goal of $5,000. § 
Alumni 
CLASS OF 1929 
JUDGE AND MRS. WALTER E. HOFF-
MAN have moved to a new residence. 
The address is .5737 Shenandoah Avenue, 
Norfolk, Va. 23509. Judge Hoffman was 
elected to the Federal Judicial Center 
Board last year for a four year term. 
CLASS OF 1938 
The town of Colonial Beach, Va. 
recently honored GEORGE MASON, JR. 
with a plaque commemorating thirty-four 
years of faithful service as Town At-
torney. 
CLASS OF 1948 
W. GARLAND CLARKE, of the firm of 
Clarke & Johnston in Lively, Va., is 
presently serving as Chairman of Lan- 
caster County Board of Public Welfare 
and President of Region II of the 
Episcopal Diocese of Virginia. 
CLASS OF 19.50 
STANLEY H. MERVIS is presently 
Associate Patent Counsel for the Polaroid 
Corporation. His address is 11 Nod Hill 
Road, Newton Highlands, Mass. 02161. 
Fort Worth, Texas claims the residence 
of JOSEPH P. PARKER, a member of the 
firm of Sears, Parker, Quisenberry and 
Spurlock. Mr. Parker is active in the 
labor law section of the Texas State Bar 
and his family lives at 3608 Wayland 
Drive in Fort Worth, zip code 76133. 
CLASS OF 1951 
While looking forward to an up-
coming business and pleasure trip to 
Spain, RICHARD W. WITHINGTON is 
serving his community as Attorney for the 
Point Pleasant, N.J., Board of Health. The 
Ocean County Bar Association recently 
honored him with a plaque in recognition 
of dedicated service to the Bar. 
CLASS OF 1956 
FLORIAN BARTOSIC, Professor of 
Law at Wayne State University, was a 
Visiting Professor of Law at the Univer-
sity of Michigan for the summer of 1972. 
Mr. Bartosic authored articles dealing 
with labor law which were published by 
the University of Chicago Law Review 
and the Cornell Law Review during 1972. 
CLASS OF 1957 
JOSEPH M. MAURIZI attended the 
Notional health and Welfare Conference 
in San Francisco this past November. He 
is a member of the firm of Balzarini, 
Walsh, Conway, and Maurizi in Pitt-
sburgh. Mr. Maurizi is also active in the 
Academy of Trial Lawyers of Penn-
sylvania, and attended the Academy's 
convention in Rome, Italy in 1971. 
CLASS OF 1960 
Attorney general Richard G. Klien-
dienst, who is also President of the 
Federal Bar Association, has appointed 
HARMON D. MAXSON as Chairman of 
the FBA's Indian Law Committee. While 
on vacation recently, Mr. and Mrs. Max-
son visited thirty-five Indian Reservations 
and attended such festivities as tribal 
dances and a rooster pull. 
CLASS OF 1962 
SHANNON T. MASON, JR. has 
recently formed a partnership with 
William Ferguson under the firm name of 
Ferguson and Mason. The address is 225 
28th Street, Newport News, Va. Mr. 
Mason was appointed Substitute Judge of 
the Courts Not of Record for the City of 
Newport News early in 1972. 
CLASS OF 1963 
THOMAS O'C. MOYLES has recently 
moved to 515 S. England St., William-
sburg, Va. 23185. 
WILLIAM M. WHITTEN, Ill's new ad-
dress is 2748 Black Forest Drive, St. 
Louis, Missouri 63129. 
CLASS OF 1964 
E. KENDALL STOCK of the firm of 
Schantz, Stock, Marshall and Walma of 
McLean and Leesburg, Va. is serving as 
Chairman of the Virginia State Bar In-
surance Committee. 
CLASS OF 1965 
C. LACEY COMPTON, JR. Wood-
bridge, Va. is presently Chairman of the 
Prince William Board of Directors of the 
Bank of Virginia - Potomac, and is also 
Vice President of Potomac Hospital. 
STANLEY C. SHERWOOD and his 
wife, the former Lynn Halsey of William-
sburg, have moved to their new address: 
Suite 225, 4700 Biscayne Blvd., Miami, 
Florida 33137. Mr. Sherwood is Vice 
President and Counsel, Greater Miami 
Title Services, Inc. He attended the 
Florida Land Title Association's Con-
vention in Nassau last fall. 
NICHOLAS J. ST. GEORGE is presen-
tly Vice President in Charge of In-
vestment Banking for Legg Mason & Co. 
CLASS OF 1966 
GUS J. JAMES, Ill became a partner 
in the firm of Kaufman, Oberndorfer, and 
Spainhour of Norfolk, Va. in early 1972. 
He is presently President-Elect of the 
Young Lawyers' Section of the Norfolk-
Portsmouth Bar Association 
CLASS OF 1967 
ROGER L AMOLE's address has been 
changed to 201 N. Washington Street, 
P.O. Box 1138, Alexandria, Va. 22313. 
Mr. Amole is a member of the Executive 
Committee of the Alexandria Bar 
Association, a member of the Board of 
Directors of Alexandria's YMCA, and a 
member of the Board of Directors of the 
Little River Village Community Counsel. 
In December of 1972 BURKE 
MARGULIES accepted a position with the 
Virginia Notional Bank as its Trust Of-
ficer. Mr. Margulies lives in Norfolk. 
CLASS OF 1968 
JOSEPH T. BUXTON, III was op-
pointed in November of 1972 Associate, 
General Counsel, Newport News Ship 
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Building and Dry Dock, Ca He has also 
been elected Secretary of the Nuclear 
Service and Construction Co., Inc., a sub-
sidiary of NNSBDDC. 
JAMES A. EVANS and his wife, the for-
mer Jeanne S. Felhofer, have moved to 
their new home at 521 Turtle Cove Road, 
Virginia Beach, Va. Mr. Evans is with the 
firm of Underwood, Byrd, Dinsmore, and 
Evans, ltd. In October of 1972 he at-
tended the International Conference of 
Shopping Centers in Tampa, Fla. 
JAMES C. PATTESON's new address is 
4608 Bromley Lone, Richmond, Va. 
23226. He is now Virginia Sales 
Representative for Matthew Bender &- 
Co., Inc., a legal and tax book publisher. 
Mr. Patteson is presently on the Presiden-
tial Search Committee for Richard Bland 
College of the College of William and 
Mary. 
THE WALTER A. SMITH's had their 
second son, Michael Ingram, in May of 
last year. Mr. Smith will continue 
clerking for Walter H. Moorman, Judge 
of the Circuit Court of Montgomery 
County, Maryland until September 1973, 
when he then plans on entering private 
practice. He passed the Maryland State 
Bar exam and was admitted to practice 
lost December. He already is a member 
of both the Virginia and the D.C. Bars. 
CLASS OF 1969 
The new office address for GRAYSON 
G. FENTRISS is Suite 606, 700 Building, 
Richmond. Virginia 23219. 
GLENN J. SEDAM, JR.'s new address 
is 907 Leigh Mill Road, Great Falls, 
Virginia 22066. 
JOHN D. SOURS will join the firm of 
Smith, Corrie and Hancock in Atlanta, 
Georgia upon his separation from the 
Office of the Judge Advocate General 
(Army) in Washington this June. He was 
selected for inclusion in the 1972 edition 
of Outstanding Young Men of America. 
1 Surfway No. 204, Monterey Califor-
nia 93940 is DAVID A. STEWART's new 
and pleasant sounding address. 
CLASS OF 1970 
The marriage of DENNIS HENSLEY 
and Adrienne Andriani of New York took 
place December 30, 1972. Their Address 
is 950 25th Street, NW, Washington, 
D.C. 20037. Mr. Hensley was recently 
named Assistant General Counsel of the 
National Association of Securities 
Dealers, Washington. 
JOHN L. NORMAN, JR. is now living 
at 924 25th Street, NW, Washington, 
D.C. 20037. As of 1972 he has been a 
Certified Public Accountant in Maryland. 
He is also executive secretary of the 
Washington Alumni Chapter of Phi Alpha 
Delta Law Fraternity. 
JAMES L. MCLEMORE, Ill has joined 
the firm of Thomas L. Woodward (Sr. &- 
Jr.) in Suffolk, Virginia. The McLemores 
new address is 122 Franklin Street, Suf-
folk. The newly married couple 
honeymooned in England, Scotland and 
France last October. 
WILLIAM R. REGISTER has recently 
moved from Juneau, Alaska to 1900 
Jamestown Road, Alexandria, Va. 22308. 
Recently assigned to the U.S. Army 
Agency for Aviation Safety, JOHN J. 
SABOURIN, JR. is now residing at 37 
Kirby St., Fort Rucker, Alabama 36360. 
The Sanbourins hod a son, Nicholas 
John, born to them in October 1972. 
Matthew Jordon Zwerdling was born 
to the JEFFREY M. ZWERDLINGS on 
December 5, 1972. Mr. Zwerdling has in-
corporated his practice, the address of 
which is 4615 W. Broad Street, Suite 
311, Richmond, Va. 23230 
CLASS OF 1971 
Since finishing his federal clerkship 
last June, NICHOLAS J. DEROMA has 
been employed as counsel with the IBM 
Corporation. His new address is Consul 
C-318 2400 Virginia Ave. NW, 
Washington, D.C. 
STANLEY M. HIRSCH has become 
Assistant Commonweath's Attorney in 
Chesapeake, Virginia. 
FRED K. MORRISON has been 
promoted to Major in the U.S. Army. His 
new address is Quarters 2437-A, Fort 
Lewis, Washington 98433. He was selec-
ted for inclusion in the 1972 edition of 
Outstanding Young Men of America. 
Having completed his clerkship with 
Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. of the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of 
Va., MICHAEL E. KRIS has become an 
associate with the D.C. law firm of Dan-
zonsky, Dickey, Tydings, Quint and Gor-
don. His new address is 6669 McLean 
Drive, McLean, Vo. 22101. 
FREDERICK L. SHREVES, II has recen-
tly joined the staff of the Office of 
General Counsel — Federal- Maritime 
Commission in Washington, D.C. His 
new address is 11906 Duke of Bedford 
Court, Reston, Va. 22091. 
THOMAS S. REAVELY is presently a 
law clerk for Justice David Harris of the 
Iowa Supreme Court, having already ser-
ved a stint as legal counsel for the Iowa 
State Senate during the 1972 legislature. 
His new address is 404 S. Chestnut, Jef-
ferson, Iowa 50129. 
LOUIS S. SHUNTICH, presently a 
member of the New Jersey Bar, has been 
accepted to the Graduate Division of 
New York University School of Law to 
complete an LL.M. in taxation. 
CLASS OF 1972 
CHARLES R. ASHMAN has become a 
partner in what is now the firm of Duffy, 
Dengenhordt and Ashman in Savannah, 
Georgia. He hos also been appointed 
Assistant District Attorney for the Eastern 
Judicial Circuit of Georgia, Chatham 
County, Recording Court, Criminal 
Division. His address is 130 E. 52nd 
Street, Savannah, Ga. 31405. 
Admitted to the California Bar in 
December 1972, DENNIS BECK is 
presently Deputy District Attorney in 
Fresno. The Becks had o baby boy. 
Craig, last November. Their address is 
3222 E. Dakota No. 144, Fresno, Califor-
nia 93726. 
WILLARD (BILL) BERGMAN of 
Morristown, N.J., and the former Jennifer 
Leigh were married on August 26, 1972. 
Bill was admitted to the N.J. Bar lost 
November and is now on associate with 
the firm of Schenck, Price, Smith and 
King in Morristown. 
PETE DESLER is presently a Captain in 
the Judge Advocate General's Corps 
(Army) and is working in the Litigation 
Division at the Pentagon. His address is 
No. 609 Seminary Towers East 4701 
Kenmore Avenue, Alexandria, Va. 
Employed with the Public Defender 
Association of Philadelphia, Pa. is 
EARLES D. LEES, JR. The Lees became the 
parents of Earle David Lees, III on 
August 25, 1972. Their new address is 
601 E. Wishort St., Philadelphia, Pa. 
19134. 
Elsie M. POWELL'S new address is 
7358 Shenandoah Ave., Annandale, Va. 
22003. She is currently employed as 
Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney in 
Alexandria, Va. 
ROBERT R. KAPLAN is now an 
associate of the Richmond firm of 
Heischler and Fleischler. His address is 
11721 Wiesinger Lone, Midlothian, Va. 
23113. 
Admitted to the Pennsylvania Bar last 
fall, ROBERT L. MARKS has been ap-
pointed Law Clerk to Judge Jay W. 
Myers, Judge of the 26th Judicial District, 
Columbia-Montour County. Bob is also 
associated with the firm of Wagner and 
Marks and his address is 132 West 
Market Street, Danville, Pa. 17821. 
MR. AND MRS. WILLIAM M. MUSSER, 
III became the parents of William M. 
Musser, IV on July 27, 1972. 
JOHN A. SCANELLI'S new address is 
795 Hampshire Lane, Apt. 201, Va. 
Beach, Va. 23462. He is associated with 
the firm of Kaufman, Oberndorfer and 
Spainhour in Norfolk. 
WILSON F. SKINNER, JR. is now 
associated with the Williamsburg firm of 
Corneal, Smith and Athey. He has moved 
to 409 Filmore Drive in Williamsburg. 
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